Ваш комментарий никак не связан с моим тезисом.
Из того, что Вы считаете, что Гайдар развалил экономику, никак не следует, что так считаю я и уж совсем никак не следует, что Аганбегян не признавал Гайдара как экономиста

Признавать заслуги Гайдара как экономиста все равно как Геббельса искусствоведом

А Аганбегян как ректор Академии народного хозяйства на юго-западной не хотел наездов.

Кстати, открылся гайдаровский форум экономических либерастов. Его открытие предваряли хорошие напутственные слова Е. Примакова. Это стоит полностью почитать.

Помнится, вы подвергали сомнению компетентность нобелевских лауреатов по экономике. И я же вам ни слова тогда не сказал

Да, попадаются еще те лауреаты. Типа Бродского

Помнится, вы подвергали сомнению компетентность нобелевских лауреатов по экономике. И я же вам ни слова тогда не сказал

Ниже нобелевских лауреатов по экономике находятся только лауреаты по литературе и мира

А высказывания Стиглица по поводу российских либерастов-реформаторов входят в сферу его экономической компетенции?

1. Стиглиц никогда ничего про либерастов-реформаторов не говорил. Это быдлолексикон - а Стиглиц к быдлу никак не относится

Этот вопрос остро дискутировался в Банке. Некоторые из нас сомневались в том, что следует вообще давать России какие либо кредиты. Мы сомневались в ее способности когда-либо отдать долги. Некоторые считали, что кредиты позволяют правительству России откладывать необходимые меры, например повышение налогов на нефтяные компании. Смущал и размах коррупции. О России было известно, что это одна из самых коррумпированных стран в мире. На Западе знали, что значительная часть наших миллиардов попадет в карманы к взяточникам и их друзьям олигархам...

Российский обвал был для руководителей МВФ полной неожиданностью. Они действительно верили в правильность своей программы. Прогноз нашего Банка был лишь отчасти правилен. Мы думали, что старый курс рубля сможет продержаться три месяца, а он обвалился через три недели. Мы считали, что олигархам понадобятся дни и недели, чтобы вывезти свои деньги за рубеж, а им для этого понадобились считанные часы и дни. Для МВФ было бы намного проще перевести свои деньги напрямик на соответствующие счета в швейцарских и кипрских банках.

2. Точка зрения Стиглица - это его точка зрения, а вовсе не абсолютная истина. Говорить о компетентности в теме реформы советской соц. экономики в российскую кап. экономику вообще не имело особого смысла - этим никто и никогда не занимался. Ни у Стиглица, ни у кого другого опыта не было.

Восточноевропейский опыт применим только частично - но, к слову, тот же Бальцерович оценивал деятельность Гайдара позитивно. Сколько экономистов - столько мнений.

INTERVIEWER: Let's start with the simplest of all questions: What does "shock therapy" mean to you?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, shock therapy is very rapid change in society. There was a kind of shock therapy that most economists supported, which is rapidly bringing down hyperinflation to reasonable levels. But there was another kind of shock therapy, which was a dramatic change in society, changing from a socialist economy, a communist economy, into a market economy by overnight privatizing, liberalizing, changing the rules of the game overnight rather than the gradual approach of changing one thing after another, so you may develop the prerequisites. So the gradual policy is really a policy that was pursued, for instance, in China as it moved from communism to a market economy. In a way what has happened is it's a race between the tortoise and the hare. In many cases, the gradualist approach wound up being faster than the shock therapy, because the shock therapy tried to push changes in societies before they were ready, before the prerequisites. You privatized before you had appropriate laws; you wound up with what is sometimes called the Wild East. And that Wild East, you didn't have wealth creation from privatization; you had asset stripping. You had the undermining of the basic social fabric of society. You didn't have growth; you had decline. You had increase in poverty rather than the fruits that capitalism was supposed to bring.

INTERVIEWER: So what happened in Russia?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: In Russia, the people were told that capitalism was going to bring new, unprecedented prosperity. In fact, it brought unprecedented poverty, indicated not only by a fall in living standards, not only by falling GDP, but by decreasing life spans and enormous other social indicators showing a deterioration in the quality of life. The number of people in poverty in Russia, for instance, increased from 2 percent to, depending on the statistics you use, somewhere between 40 and 50 percent, with more than one out of two children living in families below poverty. The market economy was a worse enemy for most of these people than the Communists had said it would be. It brought Gucci bags, Mercedes, the fruits of capitalism to a few. And there were some people who were better off. You did have traffic jams when you didn't have them before. But you had a shrinking [economy]. The GDP in Russia fell by 40 percent. In some [parts] of the former Soviet Union, the GDP, the national income, fell by over 70 percent. And with that smaller pie it was more and more unequally divided, so a few people got bigger and bigger slices, and the majority of people wound up with less and less and less.

INTERVIEWER: So it achieved the opposite of what was intended?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Everybody expected that there'd be some increase in inequality, but the way it was done, the shock therapy resulted in a far greater increase in inequality than certainly anybody had wanted and than the advocates of the market had predicted. But what was striking was they got this increase in inequality, but with no benefit in terms of economic growth. The overall GDP, the overall national income, declined. There are only four countries, three or four or five countries, that by the end of 1999 were better off in terms of average GDP than they were at the beginning of the transition. And the declines ranged anywhere from, in some cases, like in Russia, to 40 percent, in some cases 70 percent. And obviously in that context, the political support for market reforms, and in some cases even for democracy, was undermined.

INTERVIEWER: So people like Jeff Sachs would say there was no other option, there was no other road to take [besides] shock therapy, and that the way it was applied was the way to do.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: That's absolutely wrong. There were countries that were successful, and most of the countries that were successful did not follow the shock-therapy approach. China had a gradualist policy. In retrospect, in 20, 25 years, it actually has moved faster towards creating a market economy. They have a bigger stock market than almost any of the other emerging markets. So they've gone a long way, but it was step by step by step. And as they went on with this gradualist policy, they had enormous support from the people within their country. It wasn't forced on them; it was really something that everybody became convinced was the right way. Slovenia is one other very successful country, one of the countries [whose] GDP today is higher than it was at the beginning of the transition. It, too, followed the gradualist policy.

Poland is one of the most interesting cases, because it did use shock therapy to get inflation down. And some people think, therefore, it is a shock-therapy country, but that's not right. In fact, what it did is, having gotten inflation down to reasonable levels -- and by that I mean 15, 20 percent a year, not to the very, very low level -- it didn't pursue getting inflation down with a single-mindedness that was the case in some of the other countries. [Poland] then took a gradualist policy of restructuring their economy, restructuring their society. And the result of that was the best performance relative to where they were in the beginning of the transition. So there were alternatives, [and] those who choose the alternatives were more successful than those who choose the shock therapy.

INTERVIEWER: And in Russia's case, what went wrong specifically? Why didn't it work?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, there were an enormous number of mistakes one after the other. They began with the shock therapy of liberalization, eliminating all price controls for most of the commodities, but not all. The result of that was that there was a massive inflation. So the hyperinflation, the high levels of inflation, were in fact a consequence of the shock-therapy strategy in the beginning. That wiped out the savings of an enormous number of people. You didn't at that point have any basis of people having wealth to have a legitimate privatization process, using people's savings. They then had a privatization process that was corrupt, and in which the rich country's assets were turned over to a few, the oligarchs. So you had the strategy of privatization at any cost. "Do it quickly," is what the IMF kept telling them. They kept a scorecard -- how many privatizations had you done? But it's easy to privatise [when you] give away the state assets to your friends. And, in fact, it's not only easy; it's rewarding, because then they give a little bit of money back to you. So that was a strategy that was advocated and pushed. They then had policies like capital market liberalization before they were ready.

So what did that mean? You had an illegitimate privatization. The people then who had been able to use their political influence to get these billions and billions of dollars of natural resources for a pittance were then told, "Well, you have a choice: Keep your money inside Russia, or take it to the United States." The United States was having a boom; Russia, because of the policies, was in a depression. Well, if you were smart enough to persuade Yeltsin to give up these billions of dollars, you were smart enough to figure out it's better to take your money in the United States or, even better, to Cyprus, secret bank accounts, or Switzerland, knowing full well that there will be a change in government. When there's a change of government, there will be a questioning of whether those privatizations were legitimate. If you had your money in Russia, people might say: "We want to do that over again. You effectively stole the country's assets." If they took the money out, you had to protect it. So the experiences in Russia show that in some sense economists are right: Incentives matter. But under the IMF strategy, you put in place incentives that led to asset stripping rather than wealth creation, and incentives that led to the implosion of the economy rather than to its economic growth.

INTERVIEWER: So what was the option then? What would have been a better road?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, the better roads were the roads that Poland, that other countries -- Slovenia, China -- have taken. First of all, they focused on creating new enterprises rather than just restructuring the old. They focused on creating jobs and employment so that as you restructured the old, you had new avenues [in which] to use society's resources. Moving resources from low productivity to unemployment doesn't increase society's wealth, doesn't increase anybody's income; moving resources from low productivity to high productivity does. But if you have tight monetary policy that has interest rates at 25, 50, 100, 150 percent, you can't start new businesses. And if you can't start new businesses, how are you going to have the new enterprises that are going to create the new jobs? As you're reorienting the economy you take out the resources from the inefficient sectors to move into the more efficient sectors. In the United States we talk about what raising interest rates by 1 percent or 2 percent does to job creation. In Russia, at one point, their interest rates were over 50, 100, and were up to 150 percent. How could you have job creation?

That was called a stabilization policy, but it wasn't stabilizing the society. It was actually leading to these policies that lead to, in some sense, the implosion of the society and the economy and a destabilization of society.

INTERVIEWER: Give me a better sense of how this affected the poor in Russia and the average person. What exactly happened to their money?

JOSEPH STIGLITZ: Well, a number of things happened that contributed to the increase in poverty. Poverty, as I said before, increased from around 2 percent to 40 percent or more, depending on how you calculate it -- you know, one the most rapid increases in poverty that the world had seen in that short a span of time, apart from a natural disaster. What happened was that with the tight monetary policies that were pursued, and the other policies that were pursued, firms didn't have the money to even pay their employees, so while they often didn't fire them, because what good would that do, they didn't pay them. What was tragic about it is while they didn't have enough money to pay their pensioners, to pay their workers, they were giving away the valuable state assets to a few rich people. So in a way there were the resources there, [but] resources were leaving Russia in massive amounts. Billions and billions were leaving with these open capital markets. So they privatized before they had a good tax system in place. It's very easy to tax oil, and you can monitor the amount of oil coming out; you can monitor the amount of oil that's being shipped abroad. It's actually relatively easy. But they privatized it before they put in the means of taxing the most basic resource of the Russian economy.

And so by not getting the sequencing right, by not pacing it right, they led to the impoverization of massive amounts of their people. Then, with the government not having enough revenue, other aspects of life started to deteriorate. They didn't have enough money for hospitals, schools. Russia used to have one of the good school systems in the world; the technical level of education was very high. [But they no longer had] enough money for that. So it just began to affect people in every dimension of their lives.

Это, по правде говоря, не про реформаторов.

Претензии к либерастам гораздо серьезнее теретических. Ладно, если бы Гайдар с Чубайсом где-нибудь на семинаре обсуждали, например, эффективность шоковой терапии. Но их реальная реформаторская деятельность привела к беспрецедентному падению производства, беспрецедентному обнищанию населения, беспрецедентному воровству и т.д. - в общем, к катастрофической разрухе в стране..

Иа wrote: Лузер-министр Бальцерович никак не может являться авторитетом.

Претензии к либерастам гораздо серьезнее теретических. Ладно, если бы Гайдар с Чубайсом где-нибудь на семинаре обсуждали, например, эффективность шоковой терапии. Но их реальная реформаторская деятельность привела к беспрецедентному падению производства, беспрецедентному обнищанию населения, беспрецедентному воровству и т.д. - в общем, к катастрофической разрухе в стране.

Но академик Аганбегян с ней не согласен.

это тоже очень интересная точка зрения

Тут даже не важно, либерастами они были или нет.

Вашей реальности - безусловно

Основная проблема, на мой взгляд, была в том, что и Гайдар с Чубайсом, и даже тот же Аганбегян, были по сути умствующими дилетантами в той ситуации, которая сложилась в стране.
.

Тут даже не важно, либерастами они были или нет. Важно то, что за скальпель взялись пьяные хирурги, совершенно не понимающие всех последствий операции.
Если бы они стали победителями, мы, может быть, тяжело выдохнув и ослабив пояса, сказали бы потом, сидя за бутылочкой Абрау-Дюрсо 1982 года - "победителей не судят".
Но увы, история не имеет сослагательного наклонения.

Иа wrote:
И на этом настаивает человек почитатель Гайдара?

Если считать дилетантами всех, кто не имел практического опыта решения проблем реформы социалистической экономики советского типа - тем более в условиях тяжелейшего кризиса начала 90-х - то тогда все дилетанты. А как теоретик Гайдар был не хуже других

С 1987 по 1990 годы Гайдар занимал должность редактора и заведующего отделом экономической политики в журнале ЦК КПСС «Коммунист»

В 1990 году заведовал отделом экономики газеты «Правда»

А что считать победой? Тот же хирург может ампутировать ногу, но спасти жизнь. Можно ли это считать победой?
Мы не знаем можно ли в той ситуации было обойтись малой (меньшей) кровью - это отнюдь не очевидно. Собсно, о том и речь что у экономистов самые разные точки зрения

Нужны были специалисты, имеющие практический опыт руководства предприятиями.

В любом случае теоретикам в данной ситуации было не место. Нужны были специалисты, имеющие практический опыт руководства предприятиями..

Иа wrote:
Такими аргументами можно оправдать все, что угодно.

если Вы настаиваете на том, что Ваша точка зрения не соответствует Вашей реальности, то это несколько удивительно.